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DEFINING AND ESTIMATING UNDERGROUND AND INFORMAL 





"When you can not measure, your knowledge is meager and unsatisfactory" 
Lord Kelvin (Inscription at Harper Library- University of Chicago) 
  
 
 Purposes and Objectives 
  The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the state of the art of 
defining and measuring the phenomenon popularly known by the catch phase the 
"underground" economy in both developed and developing nations. The objectives are: 
1) To utilize the framework of the "new institutional" economics to 
establish a taxonomy of underground economies in order to clarify 
and facilitate measurement methodology. 
2) To highlight the particular problems that arises in efforts to 
estimate the size, growth and characteristics of the underground 
economy.  
3) To briefly describe and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of 
alternative approaches to measurement that have been undertaken to 
date; 
4) To define the role that successful measurement of the 
underground economy can play in a variety of policy contexts. 
 
The Conceptual Framework of the New Institutional Economics 
  All measurement requires a conceptual framework since measurement without 
theory is vacuous. The conceptual framework must elaborate the substantive problems of 
concern; specify the particular hypotheses that require investigation and provide a set of 
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2 Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison operational definitions of the variables that are regarded as central to the analysis.  
  In the broadest terms, the fundamental problem of the economics profession is to 
comprehend the process of economic development, that is, to understand the forces that 
generate and distribute the production, income and wealth of a society. During the past 
two decades, social scientists and development agencies have paid increasing attention to 
the role of underground or informal economies in the development process. While a 
review of this literature is well beyond the scope of the present paper,
3 this research has 
identified the underground economy with such diverse issues as: the persistence of 
poverty; underemployment; rural-urban migration; indigenous versus imported 
technology; a buffer for cyclical fluctuations in the formal economy; income inequality; 
growth dynamics; dual labor markets; industrial organization; the debt crisis; the 
effectiveness of macro economic policy; and economic accounting. In short, there is now 
general acceptance of the proposition that informed policy decisions in many areas 
require both analytical and empirical knowledge concerning the size, growth, 
composition, causes and consequences of the underground economy. 
  Yet despite this widespread recognition of the importance of underground 
activities there remain considerable ambiguities concerning the precise nature of the 
phenomenon. Different authors addressing different questions have employed a variety of 
alternative definitions of the underground economy and this has led to the criticism that it 
is "an exceedingly fuzzy concept" which "obscures analysis of central issues and is 
counterproductive" (Peattie, 1987).  While it is true that the casual usage of the terms 
"informal sector" or "underground economy" are more connotative than denotative, a 
carefully constructed taxonomy of underground economy concepts can be very useful for 
a variety of analytical and empirical issues. What is required is a unified conceptual 
framework capable of clarifying distinctions between different types of underground 
economies as well as specifying the interrelationships between them.    
  A growing interest in the development literature is to gain a deeper theoretical and 
empirical understanding of the relationship between institutions and the process of 
economic development in order to generate policies and programs to improve economic 
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  performance at both the macro and micro levels. The broad conceptual framework which 
guides this undertaking is the "new institutional" approach which directs attention to the 
critical relationships between the rules of the game that constrain human activity and the 
process of economic development. It is now recognized that policy decisions require 
empirical knowledge of the complex set of relationships that link the development 
process to institutions, and that institutions in turn, determine the evolution and 
composition of the formal and the informal sectors.  A necessary but not sufficient 
condition for understanding these linkages is a meaningful definition of the underground 
or informal economy and the ability to measure its dimensions, growth and 
characteristics.  
  The traditional neo-classical framework for analyzing the development process 
narrowly specifies a production or "transformation" function that relates outputs to inputs 
(land, labor, capital) and a transformation technology; a set of preference functions for 
individuals; and a market institution that employs the competitively determined prices of 
goods and factors as the information and incentive vehicle to determine the allocation and 
distribution of goods and services. 
  The new institutional approach (Olson, 1982; North, 1989) extends this basic 
framework by incorporating feedback relationships between the "economy" and the 
"institutions" that determine the rules of the game for economic exchange. An important 
innovation of the new institutional approach is to specify a "transaction function" (Wallis 
and North, 1986) that determines the costs associated with economic exchange. The aim 
of this new approach is to gain an understanding of the process of economic development 
in terms of both the costs of transforming inputs into outputs and the costs of exchange, 
namely, transaction costs. Policy decisions aimed at facilitating and accelerating the 
development process must be based on knowledge of the relationship between economic 
growth and the factors that effect both transformation and transactions costs. 
  Transformation and transactions costs are fundamentally determined by the 
availability of inputs and the efficiency with which inputs are combined to produce 
outputs and exchange. The availability of inputs and the efficiency with which they are 
used are affected by formal institutions that establish and guarantee rights, bestow 
privileges and administer regulations and penalty structures that serve to foster adherence to the rules.  
  As a general proposition, an economic agent is regarded a member of the "formal" 
sector of any economy when his actions adhere to, or are protected by the established 
institutional rules of the game.  Conversely, when his actions fail to adhere to the 
established rules, or are denied their protection, the agent is regarded as a member of the 
"informal" sector of the economy.  Adherence to the established rules constitutes 
participation in the formal or aboveground economy, whereas, non compliance, or 
circumvention of the established rules, or exclusion from the protection of those rules, 
constitutes participation in an informal or underground economy. Since there are a 
variety of institutions (different sets of rules covering a wide spectrum of economic 
behaviors) there are also a variety of informal sectors. The characteristics of each distinct 
informal economy are determined by the particular set of institutional rules that its 
members circumvent. 
  Members of the formal sector, constrained by a particular institutional set of rules, 
confront a different set of transformation and transaction costs than those faced by 
members of the informal sector. According to the new institutional approach, it is these 
differences in the transformation and transactions costs associated with formal and 
informal sectors that give rise to their importance for the development process.
4  
A major challenge for the new institutional approach is to empirically estimate the 
relative transactions costs facing agents in both sectors, and to relate estimated costs of 
exchange to the levels of economic development across countries and to changes in 
growth rates for particular countries. The success of these efforts is contingent on our 
ability to obtain accurate estimates of both transaction costs and the level and rates of 
growth of a nation's overall economic activity, which includes estimates of the income 
generated in what is commonly known as the "informal economy". 
 
Taxonomy of Underground Economies  
    The literature on the underground economy has avoided a common usage and 
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 has instead offered a plethora of appellations including: subterranean; hidden; grey; 
shadow; informal; clandestine; illegal; unobserved; unreported; unrecorded; second; 
parallel and black. This profusion of vague labels attests to the confusion of a literature 
attempting to explore a largely un-chartered area of economic activity. We require a road 
map through this murky territory. 
  At the outset, we will note the obvious; there is no single underground economy, 
there are many. These underground economies are omnipresent, existing in market 
oriented as well as in centrally planned nations, be they developed or developing. The 
polytypic nature of the underground economy requires elaboration of a taxonomy, 
tailored to address a variety of substantive issues of concern to policy makers.  
  Those engaged in underground activities circumvent, escape or are excluded from 
the institutional system of rules, rights, regulations and enforcement penalties that govern 
formal agents engaged in production and exchange. As a result, underground activities 
often elude enumeration and measurement in the social accounting systems designed to 
monitor economic activity. As participants in underground activities bypass institutional 
regulations, and hence risk penalties, they develop a penchant for secrecy and 
concealment. This inclination to avoid detection makes their behavior difficult to study 
empirically. 
  Major efforts have been undertaken to differentiate between various types of 
underground economies, to develop a nomenclature to identify them, and create 
operational methods for estimating their size, characteristics, composition and growth. 
Satisfactory definitions and methods of measurement are necessary to determine the 
causes for their growth and to analyze their implications for a broad range of pressing 
economic, social and political issues. 
  The critical criterion for distinguishing between aboveground or formal activity 
on the other hand, and underground or informal activity on the other, is whether or not 
the activity adheres to the established prevailing institutional rules of the game. Different 
types of underground activities are distinguished according to the particular institutional 
rules that they violate.  
  To illustrate the use of this standard as a basis for a classification system, we 
identify four specific types of "underground" economic activities: illegal; unreported; unrecorded and informal and explore their nature and interrelationships and relevance for 
different economic issues. Each underground activity is characterized by the particular 
institutional set of rules that it circumvents. The metric for measuring the dimensions of 
each underground activity is the aggregate income generated by the activity. We 
distinguish four specific underground economies and name them: 
  1)  the  illegal  economy 
    2) the unreported economy 
    3) the unrecorded economy 
  4)  the  informal  economy 
 
The illegal economy 
  The illegal economy consists of the income produced by those economic activities 
pursued in violation of legal statutes defining the scope of legitimate forms of commerce. 
Illegal economy participants engage in the production and distribution of prohibited 
goods and services. Criminologists and law enforcement officials have a natural interest 
in monitoring the size, growth and social consequences of illegal activities. From the 
prospective of economic development, the most notable illegal activities are the 
production of prohibited substances (e.g. drug traffic) and black market currency 
exchange. The illegal production of drugs provides a lucrative source of income that 
competes directly with the production of other cash crops. But its most serious 
consequence is to undermine the stability and responsibility of political, legal and 
economic institutions that might otherwise serve to facilitate the development process. 
  The existence of illegal black market currency transactions effect the development 
process by reducing transaction costs of obtaining foreign currencies and providing a 
hedge against fluctuations in the value of the domestic currency. 
 
The unreported economy 
  The unreported economy consists of those economic activities that circumvent or 
evade the institutionally established fiscal rules as codified in the tax code. A summary 
measure of the unreported economy is the amount of income that should be reported to 
the tax authority but is not so reported. A complementary measure of the unreported economy is the "tax gap", namely the difference between the amount of tax revenues due 
the fiscal authority and the amount of tax revenue actually collected. The "tax gap" 
measure takes account of the appropriate marginal tax rate as well as non compliance 
with the rules concerning deductions from and adjustments to reportable income.  
  The size and growth of unreported income and the tax gap effect the size of 
budget deficits, the government debt and tax reform policies. Tax evasion is a particular 
problem for developing nations whose already weakened fiscal authority must now shift a 
greater burden of revenue collection to monetary policy. Inflation is a major contributor 
to political instability of developing nations with its dramatic consequences for allocation 
and distribution. 
  At the micro economic level, participants in the unreported economy face a 
different configuration of relative prices for both inputs and outputs and hence face 
different transformation and transaction costs than participants in the reported economy. 
Consequently, allocation and distribution will be affected. Without empirical knowledge 
of the size and growth of unreported income, it is difficult to ascertain who are the 
winners and losers from policy changes.  
  The development literature has given little systematic attention to the problems 
associated with the measurement of unreported incomes despite the fact that developed 
economies have produced elaborate schemes for estimating its size and growth.(Feige, 
1989)  Research on unreported income has been a major stimulus to tax reform in 
developed nations and has stimulated the simplification of tax laws, lowering of tax rates 
and broadening of the tax base to reduce rates of non compliance and lower the efficiency 
and administrative costs of the tax system.  
  The growing debt crisis with its ramifications for capital accumulation, growth 
and trade make the issue of unreported income all the more salient for developing 
nations. The developing nations’ failure to generate adequate fiscal institutions is 
reflected in a narrow tax base associated with "formal sector" firms as well as revenues 
generated by state related enterprises. The pernicious consequence of inadequate fiscal 
institutions is the tendency to reinforce what (De Soto, 1989) has characterized the 
"mercantilist system".        
  
The unrecorded economy 
  The unrecorded economy consists of those economic activities that circumvent 
the institutional rules that define the reporting requirements of government statistical 
agencies. A summary measure of the unrecorded economy is the amount of unrecorded 
income, namely the amount of income that should (under existing rules and conventions) 
be recorded in national accounting systems (e.g National Income and Product Accounts) 
but is not recorded. Unrecorded income represents a discrepancy between total income or 
output and the actual amount of income or output captured or enumerated by the 
statistical accounting system designed to measure economic activity. 
  The importance of estimating the size and rate of change of unrecorded income 
can not be overemphasized. Any effort to evaluate the programmatic effects of policy 
changes designed to implement the overall development process must have accurate 
inter-temporal estimates of the actual level of overall economic activity. One particularly 
important component of unrecorded economic activity in developing nations is the 
production that takes place within the household. Although national income and product 
theory suggests that household production should be incorporated in national accounts, 
this sector is typically omitted owing to the difficulty of measurement. Various methods 
of estimating household production have been employed (Chadeau, 1985) and the results 
suggest that household production accounts for between 25% and 50% of recorded GNP 
(depending upon the valuation methods employed) in developed nations. In developing 
nations, the shifts between the household production sector and the enumerated sector are 
likely to have substantial effects on recorded rates of growth. Thus any interpretation of 
recorded growth rates needs to take account of shifts of activity between the un-
enumerated household sector, the unrecorded sector and the recorded sector.    
  A large and rapidly changing unrecorded economy can systematically bias 
estimates of key economic indicators such as: unemployment rates, savings rates, 
productivity and price levels. (McGee and Feige, 1989) Systematically biased 
information that is disseminated to individuals, firms and policy makers will not only 
distort the perception of economic activity, it will effect actual behavior. To the extent 
that economic agents base their decisions on publicly available information, false information can induce rational economic agents to engage in flawed behaviors. 
Similarly, to the extent that macroeconomic policy is based on systematically biased 
information, well intentioned policies are likely to produce unexpected and 
counterproductive outcomes. 
  Finally, since empirical research in macroeconomics relies almost exclusively on 
macroeconomic indicators that are derived from official national accounting or survey 
information systems, any systematic discrepancies in underlying data bases arising from 
unrecorded activities will distort the research results. 
 
The informal economy 
  The term "informal economy" has been used so frequently, and inconsistently, in 
the development literature that it requires special attention. Following the classification 
system suggested by the new institutional economics, the informal economy comprises 
those economic activities that circumvent the costs and are excluded from the benefits 
and rights incorporated in the laws and administrative rules covering property 
relationships, commercial licensing, labor contracts, torts, financial credit and social 
security systems. A summary measure of the informal economy is the income generated 
by economic agents that operate informally.     
  The foregoing definition of the informal sector reflects the spirit of de Soto's 
(1989) essentially legalist conception of "informality"
5 , and is broadly consistent with a 
number of definitions.
6  It should be noted that although most of the literature on 
                                                       
5 De Soto's volume does not contain an explicit definition of the informal sector. His characterization of informality is as 
follows: 
 "The concept of informality used in this book is based on empirical observation of the phenomenon itself. Individuals 
are not informal; their actions and activities are. Nor do those who operate informally comprise a precise or static sector 
of society; they live within a grey area which has a long frontier with the legal world and in which individuals take 
refuge when the cost of obeying the law outweighs the benefit. Only rarely does informality mean breaking all the 
laws; most individuals disobey specific legal provisions in a way that shall be described later. There are activities for 
which the state has created an exceptional legal system through which informals can pursue their activities, although 
without necessarily acquiring a legal status equivalent to that of people who enjoy the protection and benefits of the 
entire Peruvian legal system; these are also informal activities." (p. 12) 
      
6 Some examples illustrating the evolution of the concept are instructive: 
 (Weeks 1975):  "The distinction between a formal and informal sector is based on the organizational characteristics of 
exchange relationships and the position of economic activity vis-a-vis the State.. Basically, the formal sector includes 
government activity itself and those enterprises in the private sector which are officially recognized, fostered, nurtured and 
regulated by the State. ..Operations in the informal sector are characterized by the absence of such benefits.” 
 (Portes; Blitzer and Curtis 1986): "the informal sector can be defined as the sum total of income-generating activities outside 
modern contractual relationships of production" (p.728) 
 (Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987):"The informal sector can be tentatively defined as the sum total of income-earning activities informality is focused on urban sectors, it is clear from the definition that rural 
informality is likely to be sizable. This latter point appears to have been largely 
overlooked in the literature. 
  The salience of informal activities derives from the fact that their existence is 
intimately connected with the institutional arrangements imposed by the State. As such, 
whatever positive or negative outcomes that are associated with the emergence of the 
informal economy can in principle be either reinforced or weakened by policy actions 
which modify the institutional setting. In order to determine the causes and consequences 
of informal activity, it is necessary to estimate the size and composition of the informal 
economy. 
 
The conceptual linkage among underground economies 
Having explicitly defined a number of underground economies, it is also 
necessary to note some of the empirical linkages between them. To the extent that 
national income accounting procedures rely on tax based data sources as inputs to the 
development of the national accounting systems, the existence of unreported income will 
impart a downward bias to the national accounts estimates of overall economic activity. 
Thus, to the extent that the rate of tax non compliance increases over time, recorded rates 
of economic growth will be biased downward. 
  An analogous argument can be made for the growth of the informal sector. To the 
extent that national accounting systems are based on data sources primarily collected 
from the formal sector, a large and growing informal economy will play havoc with 
perceptions of development based on official statistics and consequently with policy 
decisions based exclusively on information provided by official sources. 
  Finally, the growth of non compliance in one area of economic life is likely to 
                                                                                                                                                              
with the exclusion of those that involve contractual and legally regulated employment. Although this definition encompasses 
criminal activities, the term is customarily reserved for such activities as those in the food, clothing, and housing industries 
that are not intrinsically illegal but in which production and exchange escape legal regulation." (p.31) 
  (Gray 1987):"Because the informal sector is defined in terms of income earning activities which escape official regulation 
and the constraints of labor legislation, an analysis of the role of the state is crucial to any understanding of its development." 
(p. 422) 
(Amin 1987):"the informal sector may be defined as including enterprises that have in common one major and dominant 
attribute: the absence of official status. In other words, enterprises and individuals in the informal sector operate outside the 
incentive or social security system offered by the State and its institutions." (p.612)   
 
 have spillover effects into other areas. Tax non compliance shifts the burden from the 
dishonest to the honest, increasing the costs of adherence to any system of rules and 
regulations. An oft overlooked consequence of growing informality is the unraveling of 
the social and political fabric. 
  
Methods of Measurement  
 
Strengths and shortcomings of alternative approaches to measurement 
    If a family of “underground” economies exists, what special problems are we likely to 
encounter in efforts to measure their size and development over time?  Any attempt to 
measure a social phenomenon whose raison d'Ltre is to defy observation is fraught with 
empirical difficulties. All estimates of the size and growth of a particular underground 
sector are likely to be subject to substantial error. The variety of operational definitions of 
the underground economy that have been employed implies that comparisons of different 
estimates must be undertaken with great caution. 
  It is therefore necessary to establish some methodological criteria for what 
investigators would regard as reasonable evidence that the underground phenomenon has 
been estimated within tolerable limits. Any research strategy must be sufficiently broad 
to encompass available evidence from different sources and obtained by different 
procedures. The evidence may be qualitative, anecdotal, or quantitative. Since different 
methods are likely to measure different aspects of the unobserved sector, estimates must 
be carefully reconciled in terms of the correspondence between different concepts of 
underground activity.   
    Three major classes of information are available to the researcher, and each has an 
important role in the analysis. First, there is the large and suggestive body of anecdotal 
information that is not easy to analyze by the systematic procedures of modern 
quantitative methods. Such "institutional" information is, however highly relevant as a 
qualitative guide to both the frequency and nature of the phenomenon under 
investigation. Anecdotal institutional information provides a necessary starting point for 
inquiry. It serves to raise many key questions and points the research in specific 
directions concerning both the sources and processes involved in unobserved economic activities. A particularly useful method for obtaining this type of information is through a 
"participant observer", namely a researcher who has made sufficiently close contacts with 
agents engaged in informal activities that he is trusted and is accepted as a routine 
participant. Much of the insightful empirical material contained in de Soto's The Other 
Path (1989) was obtained using this method. 
      A second class of information utilizes systematically collected micro-observations, be 
they from individual surveys, census reports, tax returns, unemployment records, or other 
similar sources. Micro data approaches are useful insofar as they yield disaggregated 
information that sheds light on the particular characteristics of firms and individuals 
engaged in underground activities. If such information can be combined with detailed 
estimates of transaction costs facing firms and individuals, it becomes particularly 
interesting for testing some of the maintained hypotheses of the new institutional 
approach. However, the classification scheme for counting informal employers and 
workers has often been based on proxy variables such as firm size, employee earnings or 
workers occupation rather than the extent to which survey respondents circumvent or are 
not covered by the institutional constraints that in fact define in informal activities. 
  A great deal of the empirical work conducted by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) is based on micro data sources, typically census or survey data.   
Unfortunately, census data provides no direct information on the informal economy as 
defined above, namely, those activities that circumvent or are not protected by existing 
institutional arrangements. Many studies (e.g. Webb, 1975; Mazumdar, 1975; Bose, 
1978; Joshi and Joshi 1976; Deshpande, 1979) have therefore assigned the employees 
and employers of firms above some arbitrary size to the "formal" sector, with self 
employed and employees of small sized firms relegated to the "informal" sector. Even 
firm size allocations to the "informal" sector have not been consistently applied. Some 
studies include workers in the informal economy if their firm employs less than five 
workers, while others consider informal workers as those who are employed by firms 
with less than twenty five workers. Establishment based estimates are highly sensitive to 
under reporting of the actual number of workers employed, particularly, where social 
accounting practices exclude enumeration of smaller sized firms. Discovery of this type 
of under reporting in official data sources in Italy required two consecutive increases in Italy's GNP of 8.9% and 9.8% in 1976 and 1977 respectively. (Contini, 1989). 
  Several survey studies (Portes, et. al. 1986; Merrick, 1976) based on household 
data attempt to distinguish between formal from informal workers according to whether 
or not wage and salaried workers are registered with the official social security system. 
This classification corresponds more closely to the definition of the informal sector based 
on the new institutional scheme developed above, and is useful in deriving estimates of 
the percentage of informals classified by industry. Using the foregoing classification 
system, these surveys provide estimates of relative income and earnings of "formal" and 
"informal" workers. An important, albeit tentative conclusion from studies of this type is 
that informal employees appear to have lower average earnings than "full time formal 
workers" but that informal employers incomes considerably exceed the incomes of 
workers in the formal sector. 
      Micro  approaches  to  estimation  tend to be costly and typically yield point 
estimates of the size of unobserved activity rather than temporal estimates of the growth 
of the sector. Consistently comparable surveys are typically not available on consistent 
time intervals thus limiting their usefulness in making historical comparisons. The lack of 
uniformity between micro surveys conducted at different time intervals often precludes 
their usefulness in uncovering the temporal causes and consequences of underground 
economy growth. 
  Another shortcoming of the micro approaches is that they typically rely on 
obtrusive methods of observation that may compromise the quality of the data collected. 
Incentives to conceal information may jeopardize the veracity of the response given to 
the data collector. Business, tax and employment records may be also be falsified to 
avoid regulation or taxation. Moreover, survey studies often suffer from high rates of 
non-response and from self-selection biases. 
  Non-response rates for sensitive survey questions are often 20-40% of the number 
of individuals contacted, and pose a particular problem when interviews are conducted 
with individuals or enterprises that have economic incentives to remain anonymous. 
These high non-response rates suggest the possibility of substantial survey bias when the 
cohort of self selected non respondents is those individuals most likely to be engaged in 
underground activities. In an effort to cope with non response bias, several large scale surveys undertake to impute responses for non respondents. These imputations are based 
on estimated relationships between demographic variables and the observed answers of 
respondents. Insofar as the underground activities of non respondents are likely to be 
affected by variables unrelated to demographic factors, such approaches are unlikely to 
rectify self selection biases. 
  The results of micro investigations may also be sensitive to the method used to 
query respondents. An Internal Revenue Service taxpayer opinion survey on tax evasion, 
which used both direct questions (with assurances of anonymity) and a randomized 
response technique, revealed that the randomized response yielded evasion estimates 
between 62% and 433% higher on some questions than the direct question approach. 
    An alternative approach to measurement relies upon macroeconomic data sources. An 
advantage of macro approaches is that they employ published data sources that have been 
collected for purposes unrelated to the study of the underground economy. Because these 
are unobtrusive measures, they are not susceptible to willful distortion on the part of a 
respondent. Such approaches are typically less costly to undertake, and they provide 
temporal estimates of both the size and growth of unobserved activities. Most of the 
macro approaches depend on monetary aggregates that are collected for purposes 
unrelated to unobserved activities, and often represent the most accurate official data 
consistently collected by government agencies. Currency data are readily available for all 
developing countries from central bank records and their accuracy is assured by the 
administrative security requirements associated with the printing and issue of currency. 
Similarly, data on demand deposits and bank debits are widely available and are typically 
of high quality. Monetary data also tend to be readily available over long historical 
periods and are conceptually consistent both over time and across countries. This latter 
feature is of particular importance in the context of the new institutional approach, since 
institutional change in any given nation is likely to have an important temporal 
component and institutional differences between countries require consistent cross 
country observations of underground activity.  
  Macro methods typically require a few strong explicit counter-factual 
assumptions to produce estimates of the underground economy. The reliability of any 
particular macro approach will therefore depend upon the reasonableness of the assumptions that underlie the estimation procedure. The macro methods are most useful 
for discerning longer run trends in the growth of unreported and unrecorded underground 
economies, but are incapable of providing details on the composition and specific 
characteristics of informal activities.    
  In sum, the major advantage of obtrusive micro measures is that they are capable 
of producing a rich set of detailed information concerning the characteristics and 
composition of underground activities. Unobtrusive macro methods use broad indicators 
that typically only capture aggregate underground activity. Obtrusive micro measures, 
being more costly, are rarely replicated consistently over time, and are therefore of little 
use in efforts to establish the inter-temporal development of underground activity. 
Unobtrusive macro measures are less costly and less contaminated because they often 
rely on more readily available time series that have been collected for purposes 
independent of the study of underground activities. They do however require the use of 
strong a priori assumptions to establish the relationship between macroeconomic 
"indicators" and underground activities. While the realism of these assumptions have 
been criticized in the literature, the fact that the assumptions are explicit and few in 
number, makes a sensitivity analysis of the results possible. The possibility for sensitivity 
analysis of micro approaches is more limited in so far as the assumptions implicit in the 
collection and organization of the data is less amenable to variation once a particular 
survey vehicle and methodology have been adopted. 
   To the extent that different measurement procedures have recognizable strengths 
and weaknesses, the soundest empirical strategy is an eclectic approach that evaluates 
information derived from all available sources. The first requirement is to identify which 
particular component of underground activity is captured by different procedures. Where 
different empirical approaches purport to measure the same conceptual entity, meaningful 
consistency checks are possible. Since every measurement procedure requires a priori 
assumptions, sensitivity analysis should be undertaken wherever possible. Given the 
difficulties inherent in any effort to quantify a particular underground economy, the 
various approaches to measurement are best viewed as complementary, yielding insights 
into different aspects of the issue. 
  
Specific measurement methods 
 
 Discrepancy  Methods 
  Discrepancy methods are widely used in developed nations as a means for 
estimating particular components of underground income but to date these methods have 
rarely been applied to third world nations. In some cases the procedures can not be 
readily applied because of the rudimentary and oft fragmentary nature of national 
accounting systems and the paucity of appropriate fiscal data. The discrepancy approach 
is feasible whenever independent means exist to estimate the same conceptual entity. If 
one procedure for measuring a particular form of underground activity is believed to be 
relatively free of biases induced by that activity while another procedure is known to be 
effected by the activity, the discrepancy between the two can be used to measure the net 
effect of the underground activity. 
  In practice, great care must be exercised in interpreting discrepancy measures. 
They are typically not measures of any underground sector. The observed discrepancy 
between two measures often reflects conceptual differences in what the two measures 
purport to estimate.  Moreover, if both procedures are directly or indirectly affected by 
the underground activity, then the discrepancy method simply measures the difference 
between the two approaches rather than the absolute magnitude of the unobserved sector. 
The most common discrepancy approaches are reviewed separately in order to highlight 
the different aspects of underground activity that each measure captures.          
 
  National Accounts Discrepancies - (Unrecorded Income) 
  The income and expenditure sides of the national income accounts are typically 
estimated from different data sources.  To the extent that the two sides of the accounts are 
measured by relatively independent methods, Macafee, (1980) proposed that the 
discrepancy between an expenditure side estimate of national income and an income side 
estimate of national income might be used to estimate the size of the unrecorded sector. If 
individuals are less likely to misrepresent their expenditures than they are to misrepresent 
income, such a method would capture the net difference in misrepresentation on the two sides of the accounts. This difference should not be interpreted as a measure of the size of 
unrecorded income since both sides of the accounts may understate economic activity. 
  The raw initial discrepancies that are discovered between the two sides of the 
accounts are rarely published. When sizable initial discrepancies do appear in practice, 
the accounts are usually revised to reduce the discrepancy. In countries where raw 
discrepancies between income and expenditure estimates are available by sector, the 
approach may be useful in identifying those particular sectors of economic activity that 
are most likely to be affected by underground activity.  
 
  Fiscal-NIPA discrepancies - Unreported income 
  In those nations that rely heavily on some form of income or consumption tax, it 
is possible to obtain estimates of unreported income by examining the discrepancy 
between income estimates derived from tax data sources (typically tax returns) and those 
derived from national income and product accounts (NIPA). In the U.S. the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) regularly calculates the discrepancy between actual adjusted 
gross income as reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and an independent 
estimate of adjusted gross income derived from NIPA based estimates of personal 
income. This "AGI gap" discrepancy measure represents a carefully constructed 
discrepancy measure that attempts to estimate unreported income.  The AGI gap would 
be a conceptually approximate estimate of unreported income under the following 
conditions:1) personal income (PI) was accurately measured,  that is,  there is no 
unrecorded income; 2) correct adjustments are made for all conceptual differences 
between the economic income measure PI and the fiscal income measure AGI.  
  Although the AGI gap is unlikely to yield an empirically exact measure of 
unreported income (due to the difficulties of measuring many of the large reconciliation 
items required to make PI and AGI conceptually compatible), it is nonetheless of interest 
since it highlights the conceptual similarities and differences between NIPA accounts and 
tax-based source information. These conceptual interdependencies are crucial for an 
understanding of how under reporting of tax source information will ultimately impact 
NIPA measures of GNP and PI. 
  The AGI gap measure is best interpreted as a rough measure of noncompliance in the reporting of taxable income. It tends to understates total unreported income insofar as 
it takes no account of underreporting of other types of taxes nor does it capture 
unreported illegal income since the latter is not typically included in NIPA estimates of 
personal income. Moreover, to the extent that the NIPA measure of personal income is 
understated as a result of other unrecorded income, the AGI gap will correspondingly 
understate unreported income.  
 
  Tax audit discrepancies- Unreported Income 
  In recent years, the IRS has developed an elaborate methodology for constructing 
audit based estimates of unreported income that suggest that unreported income on 
federal income taxes now approaches $500 billion per year. While estimating procedures 
of this type are far beyond the administrative capacities of most developing nations, they 
do indicate that fiscal audit data can be a useful tool in determining the causes of non 
compliance.  
 
  The payments - transactions discrepancies - Unrecorded transactions 
  The payments-transactions discrepancy method is a procedure for estimating the 
total volume of unrecorded transactions and hence provides an important aggregate 
measure of underground (unrecorded) economic activity. The conceptual basis for this 
approach is the familiar equation of exchange which notes that the total volume of 
payments (as measured by the quantity of the medium of exchange, M, times the 
transactions velocity of the medium of exchange, V) in a society must equal the total 
volume of monetary transactions (PT). 
  Total transactions can be readily decomposed into i) final goods and services 
transactions (domestic expenditures plus factor payments); ii) intermediate transactions; 
iii) transactions in real and financial domestic assets; iv) transfer payments; v) foreign 
goods and capital transactions and vi) unrecorded transactions. Estimates of total 
transactions can be derived from national accounting systems.  Item i) represents 
transactions recorded in standard GNP accounts; ii) can be derived from the nation's 
input-output tables; iii) from flow of funds data; iv) from government transfer accounts v) 
from balance of payments accounts.    Estimates of total payments made by checks are readily available from bank debit 
statistics and total currency payments can be estimated from data on the stock of currency 
and methods to estimate the transaction velocity of currency have recently been 
developed. (Feige, 1987). To date, the only effort to estimate the total volume of 
payments in developing nations has been in India, despite the fact that payments data 
provide a very promising avenue for tracking overall economic development. They also 
are likely to provide an indirect estimate of aggregate transaction or exchange costs since 
payment volume is expected to increase as the costs of exchange are reduced. 
  The discrepancy between estimated payments [MV] and estimated transactions 
[PT] provides a conceptually consistent estimate of unrecorded transactions.  Given 
estimates of the volume of unrecorded transactions it is possible to derive estimates of 
total unrecorded income from independent investigation of the ratio of transactions to 
income. 
 
Currency ratio measurement methods: Unreported and Unrecorded Income 
 
  Currency ratio (C/D) methods (Feige, 1980; 1986, 1989) have been widely 
applied as a means for obtaining aggregate estimates of the size and growth of unreported 
and unrecorded income in developed nations and the methods can be readily applied to 
developing nations as well. The conceptual justification for estimating various types of 
underground economies employing currency based methods is that currency is regarded 
as a superior medium of exchange for conducting underground transactions. In developed 
nations, currency is often employed for unreported transactions because its use eliminates 
an "audit trail" and hence reduces the likelihood that tax evasion will be discovered and 
penalties assessed. 
  In developing nations, currency is the predominant medium of exchange for 
informal transactions since informal participants typically do not have access to formal 
credit facilities which employ demand deposits as the primary means of payment. 
Moreover, even if checking facilities exist for some informal firms, currency will be the 
preferred medium of exchange when incentives exist to avoid detection.  
  The development process is itself closely related to the growth of financial intermediation that typically reduces costs of exchange. As such, one expects developed 
nations to have significantly lower ratios of currency to demand deposits than less 
developed nations. This expectation is generally borne out by the data. Moreover, for any 
particular country, one expects the ratio of currency to demand deposits to decline with 
economic growth. It was the surprising increase in the ratio of currency to demand 
deposits in the U.S. that first suggested that a growing unreported economy might be 
responsible for this empirical anomaly. Currency data now indicates that per capital 
holdings of U.S currency are approaching $1000 and that 45% of the value of the nation's 
currency supply is in the form of $100 bills. U.S households admit to holding only 11% 
of the nation's supply of currency in circulation outside of the banking system. 
  The general currency ratio (GCR) model (Feige, 1986) can be employed to 
estimate the amount of unreported income that would be generated by the estimated 
amount of "excess" currency. Figure 1 displays the estimated unreported income as a 
percentage of reported adjusted gross income for the U.S.: 1940 - 1987.  Figure 1 also 
displays the most recent official IRS estimates based on an audit methodology.
7 The IRS 
estimates for the years 1982 - 1987 are IRS projections since there is a substantial lag in 
processing audit information. The GCR time series estimates suggest a significant rise in 
unreported activity during World War II, when tax rates rose dramatically and price 
controls provided incentives for black markets. The time series also suggests a substantial 
increase in unreported activity during the past two decades which appears to have 
reversed course during the past two years, perhaps as a result of declines in tax rates and 
reform of the tax system. The conformity between the GCR results and the independent 
estimates produced by the IRS lend credence to the estimation method. 
 
 Census and survey methods:  
  It is beyond the scope of the present paper to review and evaluate the detailed 
results of the myriad of papers that report census and survey estimates of the "informal 
sector" in various developing countries. The stimulus for these estimates was provided by 
a concerted program of informal estimation supported by the International Labor 
                                                       
7 The IRS (1988) results do not include estimates for unreported illegal income. Earlier IRS estimates of illegal income 
have been incorporated in the reported figures in order to arrive at an estimate of total unreported income that is 
comparable with the estimates from the GCR model. 
 Organization (ILO) and the United Nations' Regional Employment Program for Latin 
America (PREALC).  Several observations are however in order. 
  "Informal workers" in the PREALC studies are defined as the sum of unpaid 
family workers, domestic servants and the self-employed, minus professionals and 
technicians. This definition bears only the most tenuous relationship with the definition 
of informality offered above. The PREALC definition includes all wage earners in the 
formal sector. The definition therefore takes no account of activities that circumvent 
institutional constraints, nor does it take account of activities that are excluded from the 
institutional protection outlined in section III:D.  As a result, the PREALC estimates are 
bound to substantially underestimate the number of informal workers that would be 
counted under the new institutional conceptual framework. 
  Portes and Sassen-Koob, (1987, pp34-35) draw attention to an interesting 
comparison of two alternative estimates of the percentage of the urban economically 
active population engaged in informal activities in Bogota. Under the PREALC 
definition, 34.2 % of the economically active urban population is considered to be in the 
informal sector. When the definition is changed to include workers not covered by social 
security coverage, (a measure closer to the one suggested above), the estimated 
percentage increases to 60.5 % for the same year. This example demonstrates that 
regardless of the shortcomings that may be inherent in underlying census or survey data, 
the critical factor affecting the estimated size of informal activities is likely to be the 
precise definition of informality employed. 
  Although the PREALC definition results in significantly lower estimates than 
those that would be expected under the definition proposed above, the data are useful 
insofar as they permit calculation of the growth of the PREALC estimates between the 
years 1950 and 1980.
8  Figure 2 presents the estimated percentage change in urban and 
total "informal workers" for several Latin American countries,  as estimated under the 
PREALC definition. Figure 2 also displays the corresponding percentage change in the 
ratio of currency to demand deposits over the same period. With the notable exception of 
Peru, the figure reveals a close correspondence between the rough monetary indicator and 
the PREALC estimates. This correspondence suggests that the GCR model might 
                                                       
8 The data presented here are taken from the Portes and Sassen-Koob (1987) summary table 1 of PREALC estimates. 
 usefully be employed to obtain temporal estimates of informal income in these Latin 
American countries. 
Figure 3 displays the percentage of the urban economically active population in 
1980 estimated to be in the "informal sector" as defined by PREALC.
9 .   The estimated 
range of the reported results is similar to the range of estimates reported by (Mehta, 1985) 
in his survey of seven such studies undertaken in India. In the Indian studies, the criteria 
used to classify workers as belonging to the "informal sector" was their employment in 
small enterprises. While none of the foregoing criterion correspond with the legalistic 
concept of informality, they do suggest that a large segment of the economically active 
population of these countries are engaged in small scale activities that might well be 
excluded from the institutional constraints that are deemed to be important by the new 
institutional approach. 
Surveys of informal firms and workers, despite their shortcomings, are likely to 
be a rich and necessary data source for detailed examination of a number of hypotheses 
entertained by the development literature with respect to the role of the informal 
economy. For example, the earlier development literature explained the size and growth 
of the informal sector as a passive adjustment to underemployment resulting from the 
importation of capital intensive and labor saving technologies from the developed world. 
According to this view, there emerges a technologically heterogeneous production 
structure of high capital labor ratio formal firms with high profitability, and low capital 
labor ratio firms of low profitability who can only survive by reducing their transaction 
costs by circumventing the institutional constraints imposed by taxes, labor regulations, 
and social insurance systems. 
  The new institutional view suggests that the cause of informality is not 
inappropriate imported technology, but rather the high transaction costs imposed by the 
State through over regulation. The result is a distortion of relative factor prices.   
According to this view, the informal sector, defined as the sector that circumvents the 
State's distortions, is highly productive, efficient and profitable. 
  At the micro level, these competing hypotheses can best be tested by the use of 
                                                       
9 The first estimate for Bogota displayed in Figure 3 is based on the PREALC definition while the second estimate 
denoted with an * includes workers not covered by social security. As Portes and Sassen-Koob (1987) point out, if the 
alternative definition had been consistently applied to all of the Latin American countries, the resulting estimates of 
informal activities would likely be considerably higher. new or existing surveys of individual firms which can be distinguished according to the 
degree to which they successfully circumvent institutional constraints. A detailed 
examination of factor input ratios, income and profitability is required in order to resolve 
these competing views.  
 
Policy Issues and Measurement   
  Informed policy decisions aimed at promoting the development process require a 
deeper understanding of the causes and consequences of the various underground 
economies. Measurement is a key element in furthering this understanding. If policy 
makers are to monitor the development process they require accurate indicators of overall 
economic activity. Despite the obvious shortcomings of existing measures of 
underground activity, there does appear to be a general consensus that a significant 
fraction of economic activity in developed nations escapes enumeration and hence 
contributes to the problem of unrecorded income. Whenever there is an unnoticed shift in 
economic activity between the recorded and the unrecorded sectors, official statistics that 
inform current policy decisions will give false signals. Therefore one essential 
contribution of efforts to measure presently unrecorded activity is to improve the 
information system on which policy makers must rely. 
  The new institutional approach aims to redirect policy attention toward the 
restructuring of indigenous institutions that are found to play a vital role in the 
development process. In order for this policy redirection to be successful, it must be 
founded on a deeper empirical knowledge of the specific manner in which particular 
institutions promote or retard development. Does a growing informal sector promote 
recorded growth, or will accelerated growth shrink the informal sector?  The former 
"bottoms up" approach implies vastly different policy decisions and programs than the 
latter "top down" approach to development. Figure 4 illustrates the difficulty of 
discriminating between these two bold hypotheses. The figure displays the estimated 
percentage change in "informal workers" and the recorded percentage change in real 
GDP for the period 1950-1980.
10  
Are we to conclude as do Portes and Sassen-Koob, (1987) that the "predicted 
                                                       
10 The data underlying the chart is from Portes and Sassen-Koob (1987) Table 1. 
 secular trend toward its (the informal sector) disappearance with the advance of capitalist 
industrialization has not materialized in any country of the region", that is to say, a failure 
of the "top down" theory of development; or should we conclude that it is precisely the 
tenacity and dynamism of the "bottoms up" informal sector that has supported the 
advance of "capitalist industrialization"?  On the basis of the evidence presented, neither 
conclusion is warranted. The PREALC measure of the "informal sector" fails to capture 
much of the informal sector as defined by the new institutional approach. Moreover, this 
hypothesis can not tested without a set of more complete time series estimates which may 
only be available with the use of aggregate monetary estimation procedures.  
  Does a growing unreported economy encourage the development process by 
reducing transactions costs, relative price distortions, and wasteful government 
expenditures, or does it undermine needed public expenditures and force the government 
to conduct reckless monetary policies to collect taxes by the vehicle of inflation?  Do the 
benefits from avoiding institutional constraints outweigh the costs of exclusion from 
property rights and legal remedy?  What are the income distribution consequences of a 
growing informal sector?  Do the higher incomes accruing to informal employers result 
in lower incomes for informal employees?  Does a growing informal sector encourage 
technologies and factor input ratios that benefit aggregate production through linkages 
with the formal sector or does it exacerbate technological and factor input imbalances? 
  I pose these questions to illustrate the complex nature of the policy issues raised 
by the new institutional approach as a means of incorporating the theory of informal 
economies in the development literature.  While measurement alone is unlikely to 
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